The critical mass of scholarly attention now gravitating around late medieval Syro-
Egypt has begun to necessitate for the first time an evaluation of the current state of
knowledge within the field of Mamluk history, that is, the interpretive significance of the
questions historians have so far posed of their documentary and artifactual evidence. There
is bound to be dissatisfaction with the way in which many scholars have so far used their
empirical research to address fundamental questions of structure and change in Mamluk
society. Yet, this problem is perhaps only typical of the general shortfall in critical thinking
within Middle East history as a whole. Even in such a relatively modern field as Ottoman
history, for instance, scholars have only recently begun to call for a “critical revaluation” of
historical methodology, especially with regard to modeling rather than merely assuming the
structures of early modern social formation. As the Ottomanist Suraiya Faroqhi has
observed candidly: “The intellectual framework within which Ottoman history is practised
is as yet poorly developed and this state of affairs has made us susceptible to the
‘occupational disease’ of being overwhelmed by our documents.” Indeed, Faroqhi’s
colleague, Halil Berktay, has reified this problem in Ottoman history as “document-
fetishism.” Obsession with the practices of traditional historical methodology, Berktay
charges, has diverted scholars from the “intellectual sources which could inform them about
the proper questions to ask of their documents.”

This emerging reorientation in Ottoman history has stimulated some scholars to
conceive of social formation as a dialectic between the state and peasant. The historian
John Haldon, for instance, has theorized about a tributary mode of surplus appropriation
from peasants as the principal dynamic in the rise of “feudalist” states like the Ottoman
Empire. Rejecting the class reductionism and economism of traditional Marxism, Haldon
has tried to draw attention to the anthropological content of Marx’s early writings and the
extent to which macroeconomic production may have been affected by microsocial
processes of abstraction, self-reflection and intentionality. Haldon’s view is, of course,
speculative since Marx never produced a social psychology able to demonstrate how
individual consciousness might have achieved such autonomy from collective order.

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1Rifa’at ‘Ali Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth
2Suraiya Faroqhi, “In Search of Ottoman History,” in New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman
3Halil Berktay, “The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography,” in New
Nevertheless, Haldon has sought, as he himself has said, to advance a macrotheory with the possibility of nesting a multiplicity of meso- and micro-structural analytical approaches within the overall [neo-Marxist] paradigm.” Clearly, Ottoman history, at least, has become fertile ground for an appreciation of how “change is structured, and structures change” over time.5

By comparison, medieval Islamicists have seemed less conscious of the need for developing intellectual frameworks within which their empirical research might be embedded in larger issues of social process. Indeed, more than a quarter of a century ago the Mamlukist Ira Lapidus warned that “studies of Muslim social structure are few and incomplete,”6 He extolled the need to “expose social relationships,” to examine their “total configuration” and “the forces which shaped their interaction.” Lapidus later reiterated and expanded his position, urging scholars to begin “to explore not only social action but the concepts and values that bear on the ordering of social relationships, the . . . symbols of social order, and the mentality of peoples.”7 Yet, as R. Stephen Humphreys, another Mamlukist, has been obliged to remind us recently, little interim progress has been made in demonstrating how action may have been linked to order in medieval Middle East society. Indeed, in his omniscient critique of medieval Islamic history, Humphreys has specifically criticized this analytical shortfall in the secondary literature and has gone so far as to call for new “lines of inquiry” and even entire “research strategies” to trim this interpretive deficit. Humphreys has focused particularly on the failure of Islamicists, including Mamlukists, to explicate the “patterns of behavior through which people structure their relations with one another, define common goals, and allocate resources.”8

What Humphreys has described in so many words is the need for middle range theories of social interaction, culture, ideology, and economic relations for medieval Islamic civilization, in which the Classical Mamluk state was perhaps the premier social formation. However, the gravitational pull of traditional research methods based on philology, chronology, and historiography has tended to inhibit scholars from making the necessary intellectual transition from description to analysis. Only in rare instances has Mamluk scholarship managed to model the “patterns” and “structure” of society to which Humphreys has alluded—most notably in the work of Lapidus himself, as well as his student, Michael Chamberlain. Indeed, the work of these two scholars, separated by nearly three decades, reflects to an interesting degree the development of social theory itself from a synchronic, normative, systems perspective to one with a more diachronic, materialist, and post-structural outlook.

Yet, if most Mamlukists have not been able to interpret social process, that is, demonstrate ways in which social action and order were linked, they have at least shown an

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5Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 2; see also, Gordon Leff, History and Social Theory (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1969); William A. Green, History, Historians, and the Dynamics of Change (Westport: Praeger, 1993).
interest in social actors. Scholars, indeed, have taken an essentially positivist view of Mamluk history in their Weberian focus on political and cultural elites as sources of social formation and reproduction. In this they have no doubt been influenced by Lapidus’s own social anthropology of late medieval Syro-Egypt. Yet, if scholars have sometimes acknowledged Lapidus’s ideas they have generally been unable either to develop or engage them dialectically. This may be due in part to the failure of Lapidus himself to explicate the isnād of his own social thought. Lapidus has acknowledged the influence of at least two luminaries—Max Weber and Talcott Parsons—but only in passing.9 And even this admission has not been entirely helpful given the problematic relation between the works of Weber and Parsons, particularly Parsons’s evolutionary and deterministic reading of Weber’s more developmental and contingent concept of social action. Ultimately, though, Lapidus has been indebted to Parsons’s adaptation of Weberian social action. For Parsons’s functional analysis of the evolution of Western society from traditionalism to modernism has provided Lapidus with an important framework for understanding the process through which late medieval Syro-Egyptian society achieved integration.10

Certainly, Lapidus’s interpretation of the nature of action and order in Mamluk society bears many of the hallmarks of the kind of systems analysis typical of the normative functionalism practiced especially by Parsons. He has incorporated into his own analysis many of the same functional concepts employed by Parsons—“system,” “function,” “values,” “equilibrium,” “adaptation,” “atomization,” “differentiation,” etc. Indeed, Lapidus has identified the “substance” of his work as a description of the process by which a “system” of social relations was structured to achieve social “equilibrium”—an essentially Parsonsian perspective. For Lapidus, like Parsons, was trying to address ultimately the long-standing Hobbesian problem of social order by advancing a model of society based on consensual rather than coercive social practices. Both sought to describe a social system which legitimated the hierarchical stratification of status groups on the basis of value consensus. Parsons’s focus on values was embedded ultimately in Weber’s emphasis on the cultural context of social action. Weber maintained that social action had to be explained in terms of its cultural meaning for social actors. Action and structure were mediated, Weber believed, through the individual’s subjective interpretation of his own social environment. Social actors were therefore inspired by cultural values to engage in contingent practices which reproduced but sometimes transformed society. Indeed, Weber’s legendary study of the rise of capitalism was essentially an inquiry into why rational social practices emerged in tenth/sixteenth century Europe from irrational religious

9Lapidus, Muslim Cities, viii.
10Functional thought was foundational even in the conventional Orientalist scholarship upon which Lapidus drew; see especially, G. E. von Grunebaum, “The Structure of the Muslim Town,” Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition, Memoir no. 81 (n.p.: American Anthropological Association, 1955), 141-158, who observed, among other things, that “...the unity of the [Muslim] town is functional, not civic.” Grunebaum in turn seems to have been influenced by the writings of French urbanists attempting to evaluate the social solidarity of the Muslim town in terms of Durkheim’s distinction between the “mechanical” solidarity of the traditional/archaic city and the more “organic” solidarity of the modern/classical type. That is, they sought to distinguish between an holistic society based on a religious and socially ritualized collective consciousness with undifferentiated forms of social solidarity and a rational society in which social interaction was sufficiently differentiated and diverse to individuate a self-conscious political discourse.
beliefs, that is, how the traditional world developed into the modern through the transformation of social meaning.

To demonstrate this “contingent acceptance” of such “societal values” Parsons suggested a mechanism—“internalization.” Drawing on development psychology, Parsons argued that individuals were socialized from an early age through natural interactions with family and peers to assimilate (internalize) symbolic codes of social morality, to accept normative constraints on social action in ways conducive to the reproduction of social order. The concept of internalization allowed Parsons to link social action to the structure of social order in a way that seemed more autonomous and purposeful than, for instance, Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity. Individuals reproduced society because they were socialized to do so. Yet, internalization also allowed Parsons to reinterpret Weber’s concept of social action in a way more conducive to his own belief about the integrative nature of social evolution. For Weber believed that contingent action was historical not teleological; it was meant to analyze changes from patriarchal and patrimonial forms of social organization, not to reify the process of modernization itself. Indeed, Weber felt that modern social action did not lead ultimately to greater social integration, as Parsons believed, but, as Marx believed, to the increased isolation and alienation of the individual from society. In the end structural controls imposed especially by modern bureaucratic structures vitiated individual autonomy and intentionality. Social order depended in the end, Weber believed, on hierarchical coercion not socialization after all.

Parsons attempted to counter Weber’s pessimism by narrowing, though not entirely closing, the gap between social process and social actors themselves. Action was determined ultimately by larger structural issues which tended toward equilibrium in modern society. Indeed, Parsons suggested that there was an evolutionary trajectory from traditionalism to modernism—a “convergence” of modern industrial societies toward a common form of internal organization. The functional requirements for that convergence determined historical process. Parsons suggested, in fact, a predictable sequence of social systems each more complex and functional than the last, a process which could not in the end be affected by human agency. This sequencing of social systems was an “adaptive upgrading” of society from traditional to modern organization. In this “directional” development social relations were determined functionally by the adaptive needs of the social system. Values provided the legitimating control which facilitated the “adaptive upgrading” of societies toward modernism. Parsons’s search, therefore, was for the “core” of a society, that is, its integrated social subsystems where those values were formed and practiced. Although these subsystems were drawn together through the sharing of common values, a “consensus of values” needed to be reflected only among social elites, who then used their power to “persuade” other social groups to conform to those values. The power to persuade was based on what Parsons euphemistically called “confidence” in the social system, that is, the expectation that force could be used to impose conformity should value orientation prove insufficient.

Clearly Parsons’s inquiry into the boundary between social action and order provided Lapidus with a comprehensive if deterministic model of social process. Lapidus suggested a Weberian condominium between socialized political and cultural elites, following Parsons, as a rationalizing factor in the integration of late medieval Syro-Egyptian society. Lapidus accepted Weber’s focus on cultural values as the source of social action but in his own functional analysis subsumed Weber’s emphasis on autonomy and
contingency just as Parsons had. The teleology of “convergence” made value orientation and adaptation functional requirements in the integrative evolution of late medieval Islamic society. Indeed, Lapidus proclaimed that his study of the “system of [social] relations” would demonstrate exactly how Muslim urban society adapted itself to “Mamluk domination” in order to create “one political and social whole.”11 Lapidus thought this sort of collective order was possible precisely because Muslim society “tended to be relatively undifferentiated,” and so various social strata “rarely reflected the autonomous interests of their members.”12 Clearly Lapidus shared with functionalist anthropology the belief that, the further down the social hierarchy, the more readily individuals were prepared to adopt the values of social elites.

By calling attention in this way to the lack of autonomy enjoyed by urban social groups, Lapidus was challenging traditional beliefs about the autonomy and dynamism of the medieval Islamic city itself. From Marx, who saw history as the “urbanization of the countryside,” to Anthony Giddens, who views cities as “power containers” engaged in the “elimination of the countryside,” social theorists have long attempted to privilege the city as an autonomous engine of social transformation.13 Indeed, Weber had argued that the origins of Western capitalist society lay precisely in the struggle waged by urban communes to “usurp” political and juridical autonomy from patrimonial elites. Naturally enough, Weber saw the failure of capitalism in Oriental societies as the failure of local urban autonomy in the face of patrimonial control, much as Marx had explained the failure of the Asian countryside to resist its “princely camp”—the Asian city. Yet, Lapidus did not want to privilege the issue of urban autonomy, arguing: “We must look more deeply into the urban constitution, behind . . . the struggle for local autonomy. . . .”14 In fact, Lapidus wanted to use his analysis of urban social groups to break down the entire conceptual urban/rural dichotomy upon which traditional Orientalist social history had been based: “. . . we should eschew the urban-rural dichotomy and avoid using “city” and “village” as absolute categories . . . we should think in terms of pays, districts, and regions, including both urban and rural units, as a natural form of settlement organization in the medieval Muslim world.”15

11Ibid., viii, 191.
12Ibid., 185.
14Lapidus, Muslim Cities, 3.
American social theory by Lapidus’s day had of course been subjected already to many conceptual antinomies: status/contract, mechanical/organic, Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft, industrial/folk. The foundation of American urban sociology at the University of Chicago helped to establish one more—urban/rural. To Chicago sociologists, the modern city was an unparalleled source of both liberation and challenge to the individual. On the one hand, the spatial segregation created by urbanization emancipated the individual from the social control of traditional intimate groups. However, this weakening of bonds of kinship and folk tradition left the individual isolated, living in a Durkheimian social void. As Louis Wirth observed in his legendary comments about urbanization: "Nowhere has mankind been further removed from organic nature than under the conditions of life characteristic of great cities.” The city both initiated and controlled the economic, political and cultural life “of the most remote parts of the world” weaving “diverse areas, peoples, and activities into a cosmos.” The fact of urban concentration, Wirth believed, naturally invited “the study of the differences between the rural and the urban mode of living.” City and country were “two poles” around which “all human settlements tend to arrange themselves.” For these reasons Wirth saw the “urban-industrial and rural-folk society as ideal-types of communities . . . for the analysis of the basic models of human association. . .”16

Lapidus, like many sociologists and social anthropologists of his generation, questioned whether Wirthian “ideal-type constructs” of the urban and the rural corresponded to actual differences in socioeconomic structures, functions or values.17 Urban organization seemed too diverse to be typed meaningfully. Possibly there was a condominium, even a continuum between urban and rural forms of social organization; even Wirth finally qualified his own idealized urban/rural dichotomy, admitting before his death that “cities represent a vast continuum shading into non-urban settlements.”18 In any case Lapidus did not view urban society as integrated only through what Wirth had called the “pecuniary nexus . . . [leading] to predatory relationships.” Man was not freed from moral order by the biotic competition of urban human ecology. Urban life provided the same sort of “primary” contacts which traditional socialization had, not just the “secondary” kind Wirth had described as “impersonal, superficial, transitory, and segmental.” Lapidus believed that informal social networks like families, fraternities, factions, neighborhoods,
tribes, schools of law, and religious communities transcended both the segmentation and spatiality of the classic urban/rural dichotomy; they provided regional “social solidarities” which urban communal institutions like guilds could not. Indeed, Lapidus believed “religious-communal bonds” rather than “urban-rural divisions” were the “rule” throughout all Islamic social organization.19

Rather than the autonomous city with its formal coordinating agencies Lapidus, like Parsons, saw the real source of social formation residing in the family-based household. Parsons had associated the rise of industrialism with the emergence of a dynamic “family firm,” a result of the separation of property rights from feudal control and their association with intimate or “sib” groups. The family firm, not the city, was the early engine of industrial capitalism. The family “emancipated” itself from the political structure, it did not try to take it over from patrimonial elites as Weber’s urban agents were expected to do. Lapidus saw the Mamluk “military household” similarly as the dynamic center of social power in Syro-Egyptian society, primarily because of its informal domination of the regional economy.20 Private households rather than statist bureaucracies controlled the economic “surplus” of Mamluk society. This control over the economic base of society gave the Mamluk umarâ control over the superstructure of “communal and religious life of the towns” as well. Yet, because the Mamluk household was not an “alien military establishment,” that is, it was a functional subsystem of “regional” integration, there was no overt struggle over surplus. “Regime and society did not confront each other . . . ,” therefore, social equilibrium was maintained.21

The informal network of patronal relationships which the Mamluks established with other social groups did not create the sort of anomic predatory relationships suggested in Wirth’s ideal-typification. Through such patronage networks the Mamluk political elite functionally exchanged economic benefits for social validation from the cultural elite. Lapidus interpreted this Mamluk “self-interest” as functional, not, in contradistinction to Parsons, as a source of “atomism,” which concerned Parsons about all utilitarian behavior. Indeed, Lapidus saw such self-interest as a form of social control by which the Mamluks actually “atomized the common people.”22 Mamluk military households were functionally inhibited from using their power in ways which threatened social reproduction; even their paramilitary squabbles did not, until the final decades, vitiate their “vital” function in the socioeconomic integration of “regional” Syro-Egyptian society.23 Other social groups undifferentiated by horizontal class interests, indeed unified through vertical clientelistic structures, merely internalized the reality of Mamluk domination, “. . . bending, accommodating, assimilating . . . Mamluk powers and actions in ways which created an over-all political and social pattern [of equilibrium].”24 Only when Mamluk extraction of economic surplus exceeded social norms did “confidence” in Mamluk authority fail. The

19Lapidus, “Muslim Cities,” 57.
20Household is different from family, though the two are often used interchangeably. Lapidus’s use of the term “military household” seems meant to convey the fact that the Mamluk family was surrounded by a constellation of “personal dependents and clients of the emirs,” not to imply that the military household was only a unit of co-residence without the capacity to generate normative relationships.
21Lapidus, Muslim Cities, 48-78.
22Ibid., 190.
23Ibid., 35-43, 51.
24Ibid., 78.
Ottoman conquest of Syro-Egypt in the early tenth/sixteenth century was merely the pushing over of a social system in classic disequilibrium.

II

Lapidus did not see the Syro-Egyptian city as an autonomous force in late medieval society, separated from and transforming the countryside. Certainly there were no emergent Weberian middle class agents attempting to “usurp” power from the traditional Mamluk elite; in fact, “the development of a unified and independent middle class was impossible.” Yet, neither did Lapidus view the city as a social void. Indeed, it seems to have been his principal goal in *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* to demonstrate that social integration depended on the reduction of isolation and tensions among social groups, not only between urban and rural groups, but also among different social subsystems within cities themselves. Mamluk cities, therefore, were complex units held together more by the functional socioeconomic interdependence of status groups than traditional coercive controls. And a society moving away from traditional beliefs and customs was, definitionally in the early 1960s, a society moving toward modernity. Certainly from a functionalist perspective the likelihood of an “adaptive upgrading” of Egyptian society from traditionalism to modernism would be easier to envision if late medieval society was already, as Lapidus seemed to suggest, a coherently organized social system whose subsystems were closely interdependent and relatively stable.

Lapidus’s reconstruction of the social system of late medieval Syro-Egypt clearly ought to have been groundbreaking. Yet, this expectation has gone almost entirely unfulfilled. For one thing, the slow collapse of expectations about modernization over the course of the 1960s made Lapidus’s functionalist macrosociological approach seem problematic. Lapidus’s work had been essentially synchronic, a study of the structure of the functional linkages of Mamluk urban society rather than the mechanisms which affected various social subsystems. Yet, in the developing world of thirty years ago these subsystems did not seem especially stable or interdependent, and there seemed to be little real socio-economic integration in light of the failures of industrial capitalism and pluralistic democracy. In the aftermath of modernization theory, American social scientists began to turn away from the study of functionalism to embrace that of dysfunctionalism. They began to study in earnest the microsociology of conflict, inequality and oppression—a trend which has been accelerated by postmodernist obsession with social pessimism and cultural implosion.

In this degraded theoretical environment, Lapidus gradually changed his own functionalist approach to late medieval Syro-Egyptian society. He recognized that his focus on collective order, regulation, and stability left little room finally for microprocesses of individual socialization and even autonomy. In *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* social action had been dictated by a socialized environment rather than individual intentionality. Autonomy from collective control suggested the sort of fundamental social change which classic functionalism feared as destabilizing to the entire social system. Lapidus may have been reluctant to model microprocesses of social change because they suggested the sort of internal conflict upon which Marxist social theory thrived and for

25Ibid., 190.
which functionalism had long been a preferred alternative among mainstream American social scientists. For such theorists, the pathway to modernity was better through internal value-orientation than internal conflict, through developmental prosperity rather than class struggle.

Although Lapidus continued to identify Muslim urban society as the set of "informal relations among individuals, classes and groups," he no longer felt that those relations ought to be functionally assumed by scholars. He has called instead for works which can actually model "social action," that is, "the social processes underlying the functioning of urban societies" as well as the "concepts and values that bear on the ordering of social relationships. . . ." Accordingly, Lapidus has suggested microsociologies of "loyalty, discipleship, patronage, friendship, clientage, politics, and religious education to reveal the patterns of human behavior that make . . . societies." Lapidus's appeal has been essentially for middle range theories which, one suspects, can be retrofitted to support his original functionalist insights. The results have been mixed. In the first place, though Lapidus's appeal has struck a chord among various Mamluk scholars, their work has reflected generally only low-level theorization, that is, empirical research with generalizations based on repeated observation. On the whole, these social historians have tended to avoid unifying their results into middle range theories where such empirical generalizations could be used to differentiate between material and cultural explanations of human behavior.

Lapidus's early focus on informal social networks rather than communal institutions as the source of social formation has remained, however, the basic thrust line of Mamluk history. Most of that attention, though, has been focused on isolated descriptions of the social origin, organization, and function of social elites. Thus, we possess a variety of informational studies about religious dignitaries, chancery scribes, judges, wazirs, market inspectors, civil administrators, and law court and police officials.26 A few scholars have

attempted to introduce some interpretive content, focusing especially on the mediatory role of these elites in urban social structure. Carl F. Petry, for instance, has observed that while civil elites generally failed to mediate proactively on behalf of other social groups, they at least helped to symbolize "communal cohesion" in the non-institutionalized social environment of late Circassian Mamluk society.27 Jonathan Berkey has drawn attention to the role of educators, working through an "informal system of instruction and . . . personal relationships," in helping to level social divisions within Mamluk society.28 Ulrich Haarmann, for his part, has argued that Mamluk offspring (awlād al-nās) were a critical social, political, and even cultural link between the Mamluk ruling elite and other social subsystems.29

Unfortunately neither these subsystems nor, indeed, the ruling elite itself have received meaningful analysis. Though urban gangs, rural notables, merchants, peasants, tribal peoples, and even amirs have all been described in some way, they remain little understood as components of social formation.30 Some scholars, again, have attempted to

be more interpretive. Petry and Robert Irwin, for instance, have called attention to the social dynamic of clientelistic structures in the shaping of Mamluk political action;\textsuperscript{31} focus on such dyadic non-corporate and goal-oriented relationships may serve as a corrective to the more rigid and institutionalized politics of \textit{khushdāshīyah} currently favored by traditional scholarship.\textsuperscript{32} Toru Miura has argued that the numerous sub-quarters (\textit{ḥaḍārāt}) of the larger \textit{Ṣālihiya} quarter in Damascus were integrated into a larger "political unit" through the social networks of urban gangs;\textsuperscript{33} this suggests that the function of social mediation between rulers and ruled may not have been a monopoly of the ‘\textit{ulamā’}. In a more rural vein, William Tucker has noted that natural disasters may have had a significant social psychological effect on religious practices among late medieval Egyptian peasants.\textsuperscript{34} Jean-Claude Garcin, following Lapidus’s thematic rejection of an urban/rural dichotomy in late medieval Egypt, has interpreted the rise of the urban center of \textit{Qūṣ} in terms of the larger regional dynamic of Upper Egypt itself. Garcin’s observation that "the city cannot be separated from the countryside around it" clearly recalls Lapidus’s injunction to "think in terms of \textit{pays} . . . as a natural form of settlement organization." As a crucial part of that regional dynamic, Garcin has emphasized especially the social role of the bedouin in influencing "the structure of the establishment of human groups in a region."\textsuperscript{35}


\textsuperscript{32}See also Amalia Levanoni, \textit{A Turning Point in Mamluk History: The Third Reign of al-Nāṣir Muhammad ibn Qalāwūn} (1310-1341) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), who has remarked on the collapse of corporate solidarity in the Mamluk system during the first decades of the eighth/fourteenth century.


\textsuperscript{36}Petry has recently characterized Mamluk society even down to its last days as a “quagmire of stasis,” \textit{Protectors}, 225. Problems of social inversion as well have received little attention; see, however, David Ayalon, "The Eunuchs in the Mamluk Sultanate," in \textit{Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet}, ed. Myriam Article: http://mamluk.uchicago.edu/MSR_I_1997-Clifford.pdf

Berkey, who is perhaps better known for arguing that social integration was advanced through the transmission of social knowledge, has suggested recently that social change did emerge from the fundamental tension between tradition and innovation in Mamluk socio-culture. The late medieval period was, according to Berkey, a period of “vulnerability and decay” as well as the introduction of “new peoples, ideas and models of behavior to the Muslim Near East.” Berkey’s historical dialectic suggests that Mamluk society, like all social organizations, possessed both progressive and conservative tendencies whose contradictions inevitably generated energy for social change. Boaz Shoshan, too, has maintained that confrontation between traditional high culture and innovative popular culture affected the structure of social life in medieval Cairo. The cultic veneration of shuyūkh particularly created over time “a common cultural domain consisting of shared practices and meanings.”

Concerning the Mamluk army, Levanoni has argued that it experienced in the early eighth/fourteenth century a radical transformation from disciplined fighting force to military proletariat. Moreover, several architectural studies have also intimated social change through physical changes in both sacred and profane urban spaces. This combination of architectural and documentary evidence serves as a kind of settlement archaeology, not in the sense of theorizing the relationship between social groups and their ecology but rather changes in social and cultural behavior over time as reflected in changing patterns of spatial organization. This includes especially the process of


Boaz Shoshan, Popular Culture in Medieval Cairo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 78.

Levanoni, Turning Point.

privatization of public space, a key development which many historical anthropologists have recognized about social transition from the traditional to the modern.

III

Nevertheless, Lapidus’s view of late medieval Syro-Egypt as a society in equilibrium, functionally integrated through normative behavior, has not been fundamentally challenged. That is, until recently by Lapidus’s own student, Michael Chamberlain. Like many before, Chamberlain has adopted Lapidus’s position on “institutional” history, that an undifferentiated social formation can be better explained in terms of informal social networks than formal communal institutions. Like Lapidus, too, Chamberlain has located that social dynamic among political/cultural elites. Chamberlain’s elites, however, are engaged in a social process which completely transforms Lapidus’s integrated social subsystems into autonomous social units operating in “arenas of a never-ending struggle for social power and status.”41 Social action is no longer based on internalized values but on the materialist logic of utilitarian strategy and practices. Power now defines culture; value consensus gives way to value manipulation. The perceptions people have of social life are no longer necessarily stable or shared in such a way that social action can be coordinated. Social knowledge, in short, is no longer functionally supportive of social order. Indeed, the reproduction of social order is no longer based on accepting constraints on social action but in exceeding them. Chamberlain’s methodological rejection of Lapidus’s normative functional analysis—“metaphors derived from functioning bodies”—appears to be derived largely from his readings in the social psychology of the late German sociologist, Norbert Elias, as well as the cultural anthropology of the French post-structuralist, Pierre Bourdieu.42

Like Parsons, Elias had studied at Heidelberg University not long after the death there of Weber. Like Parsons, too, Elias was fascinated by psychoanalysis and admired Parsons’s ability to psychologize the macrosocial process. However, Elias disagreed with Parsons’s Weberian focus on action, particularly his view that social systems could only be comprehended as abstractions in which there existed a logical necessity that action always be integrated. Elias charged that this made society seem too much like a “medley of disembodied actions” rather than “networks of human beings in the round.” Elias and, after him, Bourdieu sought to close the interpretive gap between the individual and society, suggesting that social action possessed its own dynamic, one unpredictable even to social actors themselves. In place of Parsons’s immutable, functionally integrated society, Elias and Bourdieu suggested a collation of interdependent human networks forming autonomous spheres of action structured by their own immediate histories and internal logic. Importantly, these spheres were subject to processes not only of integration but disintegration as well. For Elias these spheres or “figurations” were the result of the “interweaving of countless individual interests and intentions” into autonomous outcomes. These “relational dynamics” were created by constantly changing power balances among these human networks, although there was ultimately an historical trajectory from violent

42Ibid., 21-22.
figurations to more pacific ones. For Bourdieu such spheres or “fields” are spaces for competition and conflict rather than socialization and cooperation. The structure of the field in turn is determined by the state of the relations of force between various social actors or “players.”

Elias’s figuration theory and Bourdieu’s field theory share with Parsons’s functionalist systems theory, however, a common focus on differentiation and autonomy in social organization, though as a source of change rather than equilibrium, as process rather than stasis. There are no deterministic relationships among the subsystems, no organic cohesion or self-regulation as in a functionally interdependent social system; coherence is achieved only accidentally and temporarily. Even the imagery is quite different. Whereas Parsons sought a “boundary” between action and order in the social system, Bourdieu has conceived of the social field as a “fluid” process.

These theories, moreover, are all tied to linear models of social evolution which depend heavily on distinguishing dialectically between pre-industrial and industrial types of social organization. Parsons had described the process of modernization as a series of structural differentiations facilitating the “directional” development of early modern rational socioeconomic organization into modern bureaucratic industrialism. Elias attempted similarly to tie his process of Zivilisation to the evolutionary expansion and internalization of social control as a form of rational behavior. As webs of interdependent social networks expanded and became more dense, social action became correspondingly more controlled and society more differentiated. The constant division and subdivision of social functions transformed social control from external compulsion to internal self-discipline, part of the emergence of rational behavior.

Bourdieu, unlike Parsons and Elias, has been interested not in Weberian rational action but practical logic—what it makes sense to do—which may in fact be irrational; he has tried, however, to draw the same distinction between “material” and “symbolic” power in society that Weber once drew between “economic order” (wealth) and “social order” (honors). In his search for what is essentially the cultural process underlying (intra)class conflict Bourdieu has distinguished pre-industrial (pre-capitalist/doxic) from industrial (capitalist/discursive) social formations in terms of their autonomization of symbolic power. Pre-capitalist societies, being insufficiently developed economically to differentiate the material from the symbolic, were unable to produce an explicit symbolic system capable of generating the sort of competitive discourse leading necessarily to class struggle. The rise of capitalist societies, however, autonomized a discursive symbolic sphere capable of providing the dominated with “symbolic means of rejecting the definition of the real” hitherto imposed by the dominant material class. The producers of symbols (artists, writers and other intellectuals) are seen to struggle on a “field of opinion” with the dominant material class “for the power to impose the legitimate mode of thought and expression” in modern class societies; the dominant class eventually turns to symbolic power as well in order to continue its dominance. In this intellectual field of struggle for position, capital is no longer just accumulated but differentiated into economic and cultural types, each mutually convertible. The dominant class in capitalist society must, for a variety of reasons, convert some of its economic capital into cultural capital. The center of this conversion is the educational system, which is tied to the need to provide a market for cultural capital. Here class struggle is replicated and legitimated through the conversion of social position
into educational merit; the cultural capital produced was then later reconverted into economic power by the dominant class to preserve its position.  

Bourdieu figures significantly in Chamberlain’s explanation of the effect of such unconstrained competition on social order in a medieval Muslim city. Part of Bourdieu’s appeal may be that his theory of social strategies is extrapolated from his own anthropological observations about modern Muslim village life among the Algerian Kabyle. For Bourdieu, the Kabyle village was a center of eternal competition for status fought out by kinship groups using symbolic taxonomies. In such pre-capitalist societies, where a “system of mechanisms . . . ensuring the reproduction of the established order by its own motion” has not yet emerged, these strategies of “symbolic violence” were often more important and “economical” than “overt (physical or economic) violence” as “elementary forms of domination.”  

To some degree, then, Chamberlain’s Damascus is Bourdieu’s Kabyle village writ large. Damascene social life was similarly consumed by the constant and largely symbolic struggle for control of knowledge (‘ilm) as a way of achieving power and status, ultimately of ensuring “social survival.” Sixth/twelfth through eighth/fourteenth century Damascus was a suitably “precarious” and “turbulent period” in which elite social competition (fitnah) “imposed its own logic” on the strategies and practices by which medieval Damascenes acquired economic and cultural capital. Chamberlain’s vision of a turbulent high medieval period is of course consistent with the belief common to both Elias and Bourdieu that the medieval period antedated the civilizing/modernizing process. Whereas Weber had envisaged the movement toward rational action beginning in the tenth/sixteenth century, Elias had seen already in the ninth/fifteenth century standards of control being imposed on society by political elites who were themselves making the transition from warrior violence to courtly manners. The high medieval period by contrast was a sinkhole of personality development. In language reminiscent of Johan Huizinga’s “violent tenor of life,” Elias suggested that social relations in the medieval period were violent, impulsive, aggressive, cruel, and without conscience.  

The ninth/fifteenth century was also an important benchmark in Bourdieu’s analysis of the cultural process of modern class struggle. It was the beginning of the historical autonomization of a symbolic system in which the intellectual/artist freed himself culturally from the political and religious agencies of pre-capitalist legitimation in order to produce a competitive ethical/aesthetic discourse. In arguing that this process of autonomization was already underway in Damascus well before the ninth/fifteenth century, however, Chamberlain has modified Bourdieu’s model of historical development. Chamberlain’s focus on the social competition to control knowledge (‘ilm) presupposes already in the high medieval period a social elite (a’yân) as a specialized group of symbolic producers, attempting to monopolize the objectified instruments of symbolic struggle (i.e., reading, writing, certification). This further supposes, following Bourdieu, that that struggle was part of a larger social competition with the dominan economic class (umarâ’) for control of the “hierarchization of the principles of hierarchization.” Chamberlain argues, in effect, that medieval Damascus was already sufficiently developed in terms of exchange relations to

44Ibid., 190-197.  
generate an explicit symbolic system autonomous enough to engender class struggle. Yet, it is difficult to see how that struggle might have occurred since Chamberlain does not believe that there was a "division of social and political labor" between the a'yān and umarā' of Damascus. Moreover, while Chamberlain speaks of the medieval Middle East generally as possessing a "relatively high monetization of its economies," it is unclear if this could have constituted the sort of capitalistic development that Bourdieu has in mind. Finally, according to Chamberlain, medieval Damascus had "no educational system to reproduce existing social divisions," another limitation on Bourdieu’s thinking.

Despite these qualifications, Chamberlain remains fundamentally indebted to Bourdieu’s basic understanding of social structure as a product of radically contingent action by self-reflective individuals rather than an "institutionalized call to order," though even Bourdieu has admitted that rules can facilitate the generation of such action. This has allowed Chamberlain to interpret the "continuous reshuffling of power and resources" by practical, self-indicating elite households (buyūt; sg., bayt) as the "fundamental dynamic of political and social life" in medieval Damascus. Damascus, in effect, is no longer a society—the locus of social cooperation—merely a social space dedicated to unlimited "struggle for social power and status." And yet, Chamberlain’s observation that elite social competition (fitnah) was responsive to mediation seems to recognize ultimately a limitation to the radical contingency of social practice and strategy. Members of the Damascene elite negotiated among themselves for complementary shares of social and economic capital. Rulers (salāfīn, nuwwāb) especially, able only "to frustrate other social bodies’ independent possession of power or wealth," were obliged to negotiate both with the a'yān for "use of the sacred" and with the umarā' for political power. One might infer that the aggregation of such bargaining created in effect a "negotiated order" in which differences could be neutralized, if not resolved, in such a way that necessary connective social operations might occur. Individuals could bond at least temporarily, adopting complementary or even similar values, which could become the basis of an occasionally unified social system.

Indeed, rhetoric about practice and strategy aside, the a'yān and umarā' still appear as functionally interdependent in Chamberlain’s analysis as in that of Lapidus. In what Chamberlain describes as an "exchange among surplus-consuming groups" of status for benefit, amirs engaged in a deterministic exchange of their economic capital for the cultural capital of urban notables. Chamberlain’s conclusion that "the a'yān of the city accommodated themselves to the military patronage state" seems little different ultimately from Lapidus’s earlier observations about the functional "adapting [of] urban Muslim society to Mamluk domination," or its "... accommodating ... Mamluk power and

46Ibid., 8.
47Ibid., 1, 40.
48Ibid., 154.
49Bourdieu, Outline, 17.
50Chamberlain, Knowledge, 8, 46.
51Ibid., 9, 175; Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992), 16: "... Bourdieu explodes the vacuous notion of 'society' and replaces its with those of field and social space."
52Chamberlain, Knowledge, 41, 49.
In both cases the a’yān appear to have successfully internalized Mamluk domination. Moreover, it was not just the a’yān and umarā’ that were functionally related. According to Chamberlain the salāfīn and nuwwāb also had a “functional dependence on their subjects.” Rulers, unable to “penetrate the cities they dominated through intrusive state agencies,” fit themselves “into existing social and cultural practices . . . turning them to political use.”

Precisely because such “social and cultural practices” were products of urbanization in Damascus, Chamberlain’s analysis, unlike that of Lapidus, reflects ultimately an urban rather than a regional perspective on social formation in medieval Syro-Egypt. Urbanization, moreover, had a more anomic consequence on Chamberlain’s Damascenes than on those of Lapidus. Chamberlain’s Damascus was, in effect, a social void of secondary contacts possessed of the same “segmented character and utilitarian” that Wirth originally described. Bourdieu, though, is the real source of Chamberlain’s view of urbanization. Like Durkheim before him, Bourdieu believes that urbanization was crucial to the erosion of traditional social solidarity. For Durkheim urbanization led eventually to increased crime and suicide; for Bourdieu it leads to the emergence of a zone of struggle over the symbolic manipulation of the conduct of social reality—the field. It was only in the city that people with sufficiently diverse cultural traditions were sufficiently concentrated to be able to recognize their own formerly misrecognized social domination; it was in the city that their own cultural traditions were exposed, revealing “their arbitrariness practically, through first-hand experience.” Damascus, according to Chamberlain, experienced a similar process of urbanization at the end of the fifth/eleventh century, when “pastoralists, professional and slave troops, and urban elites” found themselves thrown together into an “empire-building process” stimulated by external threats to Syro-Egypt.

In that dynamic historic moment, however, socialization gave way to survival. Damascus became a social space without a Parsonsian “core.”

IV

The integration of social theory and Mamluk history over the last thirty years has achieved only limited results. Much of that achievement, moreover, resides in the work of just two scholars, Lapidus and Chamberlain. Only in their writings do we possess meaningful interpretation of social formation and reproduction in Mamluk Syro-Egypt. Social life is generally understood to be composed of such things as beliefs, norms, laws, knowledge, and ideas. Lapidus’s interpretation has been, correspondingly, that of a functional, norm-based, regional society; Chamberlain’s view has reflected a utilitarian, knowledge-based, urban space. Yet, both have underscored recent thinking about the necessity of studying informal urban/regional social groups in terms of attitudes based on

53Ibid., 17, 61; Lapidus, Muslim Cities, 78, 191.
54Chamberlain, Knowledge, 17.
55Lapidus, “Muslim Cities,” 56: “However superior the functions of the towns may have been, Muslim communities were often regional rather than urban bodies.”
56Bourdieu, Outline, 233.
57Chamberlain, Knowledge, 37-38; this dating is probably derived from Lapidus, see, for instance, Lapidus, Muslim Cities, xiii-xiv; idem, “Muslim Cities,” 52-53, 72; idem, “The Evolution of Muslim Urban Society,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 15 (1973), 38-50.
locality, ethnicity, religion, kinship, etc., rather than categorized class-based attributes. In Mamluk Syro-Egypt household, not class, was the basis of social formation—though not apparently of social change. For Lapidus’s elite households were socialized, their action functionally integrated; even when their behavior became dysfunctional owing to environmental pressures, Mamluk society did not experience structural change or innovation in the relations of power, only collapse. Even Chamberlain’s elite agents of social conflict (fitnah) could only manipulate and exploit structure, never consciously question or alter it. Ultimately, Damascus was not a center of macrosocial change, only constant microsocial transformations.

Yet, change is difficult to detect in social processes which appear deterministic or subconscious rather than cognitive. The human capacity for change resides after all in consciousness—the ability to perceive and synthesize many perspectives into one unitary apprehension of reality. Consciousness is formed within the structures of linguistically or symbolically mediated interaction. Society, in effect, is constituted intersubjectively through gestural communication, including language. Gestures are transformed into symbols with meaning understood by both parties. George Herbert Mead’s theory of gestures shows how contingent action by individuals is actually enmeshed within symbolic structures. These gestures are in effect a social institution, what Mead called “an organization of attitudes,” which condition social interaction. Individuals behave in terms of potential response by partners in these interactions, internalizing the expectations they have of each other. In this way social norms—by extension social order—become susceptible to change through modifications in communication. Cognition, in short, can have an adaptive affect on action and order through linguistic and symbolic expression.

Social order is, of course, hierarchical, and hierarchy has figured importantly in the discussions of both Lapidus and Chamberlain. The structure of such hierarchization can be seen to depend on superiors, equals, and inferiors developing an intersubjective understanding of one another at the cognitive level—“taking the role of the other” as Mead once observed. Individual behavior is integrated collectively by means of reciprocal expectations about behavior. Effective communication about these expectations can be seen, therefore, as supportive of social order; understanding a symbolic action after all means understanding about rules. It seems unlikely that social process can ever be demonstrated as either strictly normative or utilitarian, functional or self-indicating as Lapidus and Chamberlain have suggested. It may be possible, however, to fulfill Lapidus’s original mandate about exploring concepts, values, and symbols of social order by demonstrating how action and structure were mediated through the establishment of a communicative order within Mamluk society, and how social order depended ultimately on keeping those lines of communication open.