The amount of tax revenues from farm villages was estimated throughout Egypt and Syria on the basis of the cadastral survey referred to as *al-rawk al-Nāširī*, conducted during the third reign of Sultan al-Nāşir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn (709–41/1310–41). Based on the results of the survey, *iqtā’s* were reallocated to soldiers, giving priority to the Mamluks. Simultaneously, a new ratio for the division of agricultural land into *iqtā’s* and *khāṣṣ* land (land in the government’s domain) was fixed. The government’s control over the allotment of *iqtā’* was greatly strengthened through this *rawk*, and the political, military, and financial systems of the Mamluk state were finally established on the basis of the highly centralized *iqtā’* system. It is commonly understood that this resulted in the formation of the basic structure of the Mamluk state.\(^1\)

However, the state structure thus established began to crumble after the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century, when the Mamluk state was thrown into political and social confusion. It was thus obliged to transform itself in various respects. Although this is considered as superficial evidence of the decline of the Mamluk dynasty thereafter, in recent years, several important articles have been published, attempting to document the transformations in state and society, especially the changing domestic and international situations during the rule of the Circassian Mamluks (784–922/1382–1517). These articles throw new light on Mamluk history.\(^2\)

Presently, Mamluk studies has reached a stage where the historical development

\(^1\)On *al-rawk al-Nāširī* and its significance, see: Sato Tsugitaka, *State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam: Sultans, Muqta’s and Fallahun* (Leiden, 1997), Chap. 6.

of the Mamluk regime throughout the whole of the Mamluk era is being reassessed through further research on the structure of the state and society during the period of “decline.”

From this perspective, this article is concerned with a special financial bureau called al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, which was founded by al-Zāhir Barquq, the first sultan of the Circassian Mamluks (r. 784–91, 792–801/1382–89, 1390–99). The existence of this dīwān, which was charged with providing monthly wages and other essentials to the sultan’s mamluks, was the most obvious difference between the state machinery of the Bahri Mamluks (648–784/1250–1382) and the Circassian Mamluks. However, thus far, the study of this dīwān has been superficial and little is known about it despite its having played a crucial role as the most important bureau during this period. I believe that elucidating the implications of its establishment and evolution will also contribute to understanding the problems that confronted the Circassian Mamluk state, compelling it to undertake such an institutional change.

In this article, we trace the historical development of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad from its establishment until its fiscal bankruptcy on the eve of the enthronement of Sultan al-Ashraf Qāytbāy in 872/1468, who had initiated financial and administrative reforms in order to revitalize the weakened Mamluk state. We also investigate the political and social factors underlying this transformation in order to show that it was not a superficial alteration of the financial machinery; rather, it was closely linked to the process of the collapse of the iqṭā’ system, established through al-rawk al-Nāṣirī, and the resulting transformation of the state structure.

THE POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SITUATION IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE EIGHTH/FOURTEENTH CENTURY PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AL-DĪWĀN AL-MUFRAD

It is necessary to examine the political and financial situation after the death of Sultan al-Nāṣir in 741/1341 and to understand the problems that confronted Barquq when he seized power. Regarding the political situation, the Mamluk state was undergoing “political chaos,” primarily caused by a fundamental problem concerning the character of the sultan’s power and the path of succession. Power struggles in those days were basically caused by three factors: first, contesting for power between the Qalāwūnid sultans, who ascended on a lineage basis, and the Supreme Council (majlis al-mashūrah), comprising several senior Mamluk amirs; second, factional rivalries among the amirs; third, the direct intervention of the Royal Mamluks (al-mamlāk al-sultāniyāh) in the political process. The Royal Mamluks were a powerful political group because they possessed the armed strength required to win such struggles. After a series of struggles, Sultan al-Ashraf Sha'bān was killed during the coup d’état in 778/1377. In the following year (779/1378), Amir

3Cf. Petry, Protectors or Praetorians?, 190–219.
Barquq finally seized power and began to rule through the agency of the position of atābak al-'asākir (commander-in-chief) with the title of al-amīr al-kabīr (the Grand Amir). Subsequently, the principle that the paramount individual among the Mamluk amirs would assume the supreme seat with the support of a Mamluk factional power base and through an agreement among the Mamluks, which was the political system prior to the establishment of the Qalāwūnid “royal authority,” was re-established. This principle was maintained for the remainder of the Circassian Mamluk period, determining the fundamental character of the sultan’s power.4

It now became essential for Barquq, who had emerged as the final winner in the series of power struggles, to rebuild the state structure that had been weakened during the previous volatile situation. The matter that required immediate attention was that of finance, which was responsible for affecting the stability of successive governments. The period of political and social upheaval following the death of al-Nāṣir was marked by a financial crisis. It had become difficult for the state treasury to meet expenses; therefore, dismissals and resignations of successive viziers were frequent. Although an increase in allowances and provisions for the army, the eunuchs, the harem, etc., was observed to be the principal cause of the financial difficulties,5 it was not their only cause. The generous special bonus (nafaqah) paid to the Royal Mamluks for the purpose of gaining their support during political struggles had strained the treasury.6 In addition to this, the great plague, which first broke out in 749/1348–49, played an additional, crucial role in the economic deterioration, resulting in rural depopulation and a subsequent decline in agricultural production in the Middle East.7 Moreover, the “political confusion” in those days also impoverished rural areas in Egypt and Syria because it resulted in the government and the iqtâ’ holders neglecting ‘imārah (cultivation of land) and exacting oppressive taxes from peasants, in addition to the subsequent plundering


of these areas resulting from the incursion of bedouin tribes with their herds and flocks.\(^8\) There is no doubt that these varied factors contributed to economic decline and ensuing financial difficulties. However, the immediate cause of the decrease in state revenues was a problem arising from the system of landholding, which was characterized by the alienation and privatization of state lands that produced \textit{kharāj} (land tax) revenues for the state treasury.

With regard to agricultural land in Egypt, which was the principal financial resource of the Mamluk state, 14 \textit{qirāṭs} (14/24) were allotted to amirs and the \textit{halqah} troopers as \textit{iqṭā’}, and the remaining 10 \textit{qirāṭs} (10/24) became \textit{khāṣṣ} land. \textit{Iqṭā’}s for the Royal Mamluks were allocated from the \textit{khāṣṣ} land, with the remainder allocated for other governmental needs.\(^9\) According to the traditional financial system of the Mamluk state, the vizier was in charge of the financial affairs of the government as the chief financial officer, and the bureau headed by him was called the Dīwān al-Wizārah/al-Dawlah (the vizier’s bureau/the state bureau).\(^10\)

Although the state’s economic and financial difficulties were predominantly due to the above-mentioned reasons, I believe that another direct cause was the decrease in taxable lands held by the government. Al-Maqrīzī’s account reads as follows:

\begin{quote}
On 11 Șafar 783 (7 May 1381), Shams al-Dīn Abū al-Faraj al-Maqsī resigned from the office of vizier owing to the impotence of the office, because a huge amount of land had been lost from [the resources for] its work. . . . The following day, the Grand Amir (Barqīq) sent a \textit{khil’ah} (robe of honor) to al-Maqsī in order to persuade him to continue [in office] as before. However, he declined the offer because the lands that had been lost from the state [bureau’s resources] could not be recovered.\(^11\)
\end{quote}


At this point, it should be noted that at the beginning of Barquq’s rule, the decrease in government land was regarded as a crucial problem in the state’s finances and it was described as the reason for the vizier’s resignation and his adamant refusal of Barquq’s offer. We will now investigate the two causal factors that Barquq attempted to address during his reign. The first was that amirs had rented large quantities of agricultural land from the state treasury. On 19 Ramadān 784 (26 November 1382), Barquq deposed the Qalāwūnid nominal sultan al-Šāliḥ Ḥājjī and pronounced himself sultan. He then immediately appointed Shams al-Dīn Ibn Kātib Arlān, who was the chief manager (nāẓir) of Barquq’s office (dīwān) when he was an amir, as the vizier and ordered him to restore the fiscal integrity of the state:

Since al-Malik al-Zāhir (Barquq) ascended to the sultanate, some time had passed. [But] the [financial] affairs were not in order. Therefore, he appointed him [Ibn Kātib Arlān] to the post of vizier in Muḥarram 785 (March 1383). . . . At the time of his appointment, there was neither one dirham [in cash] nor one qadāḥ of grain in the [state] coffers, [because] state lands had been rented by amirs at a lower rate than their value by means of making advance payments.¹²

This indicates that a large amount of government land that should have been producing tax revenues for the state treasury had been “rented” by the powerful amirs for negligible amounts; in other words, the lands had passed into their de facto possession.

The second problem was an increase in the sales of state land and subsequent “waqfization” of the lands thus sold. During this period, a substantial amount of agricultural land had been sold by the state treasury as milk (private real estate), and then turned into waqf (religious trust) for the support of religious institutions or the descendants of sultans and amirs. Accordingly, in 780/1379, which was the year following his ascension to power as atābak, Barquq called a meeting to discuss this problem in order to make such acts illegal and to implement the return of the alienated lands to the state treasury:

On 16 [Dhū al-Hijjah 780] (5 April 1379), the Grand Amir Barquq summoned qadis and learned shaykhs and consulted with them regarding the cancellation (hahl) of waqf lands allotted for mosques (jawāmi’ wa-masājid), schools (masāris), and Sufi convents (khawānsa wa-zawāyā wa-rabi), for descendants of sultans (mulūk), amirs, and others, and for pious rizqahs, and whether the sale of Egyptian and Syrian kharaj lands from the state treasury was [legally] permissible or not. Documents concerning Egyptian and Syrian lands that had been turned into waqf or privatized—the amount [of loss] was an enormous sum of money every year—were presented. When these were read to the amirs and learned men present [at that consultation], Amir Barquq stated, “This is the matter that has weakened the army of the Muslims.”

Barquq’s questioning of this circumstance, the legality of which had remained largely unchallenged until this time, indicates that he considered the management of the government to be seriously impeded by the sale and “waqfization” of state lands, which had intensified following al-Nasir’s reign. That is to say, the increase in waqfs caused a decrease in government tax revenues because the waqf properties were tax-free owing to their religious nature. Moreover, state lands had often been sold for a pittance by means of an immediate refund of the price paid to the

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13 Rizqah (pl. rizaq) is land allotted by the sultan from the state treasury. It is classified under two categories: the first one is the “military rizqah” (al-rizaq al-jayshiyah), which was allotted to retired amirs or widows and orphans of dead amirs. The second one is the “pious rizqah” (al-rizaq al-ahbasiyah), which was allotted to religious institutions or religious men. See: A. N. Poliak, Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon, 1250–1900 (London, 1939; repr. Philadelphia, 1977), 32–34; Takao Ito, “Aufsicht und Verwaltung der Stiftungen im mamlukischen Ägypten,” Der Islam 80 (2003): 55–61.

14 Suluk, 3:345.


16 Muhammad Muhammad Amīn, Al-Awqaf wa-al-Hayāh al-Ijtima’iyah fi Miṣr 648–923 A.H./1250–1517 A.D. (Cairo, 1980), 279. Taysiir also says that the state land sale and the subsequent “waqfization” was one of the reasons for the decrease in revenues in Egypt that occurred during the period from al-rawk al-Nasiri till the enthronement of Barquq. Moreover, it was also regarded as a reason for the agricultural decline because the ‘imārah of waqf lands was often neglected (Taysir, 79–83). While Abū Ghāzi, basing his findings on archival sources, describes the phenomenon as widespread under the Circassian Mamluks (Abū Ghāzi, Tatwawwur, 10, 16–17), we also find this situation described for earlier times in the literary sources.
state treasury for the land.\textsuperscript{17}

Thus, these two factors that had led to the alienation of state lands were the fundamental causes of the financial difficulties at the time of Barquq’s ascent to power. Moreover, their effects on the \textit{iqt\'a} system, which was based on the principle of state landholding and its full control over land allocation, cannot be ignored; this topic will be addressed later. Although the reasons for the problems that arose after the death of Sultan al-N\'asir require careful examination, it is plausible that the damage to rural districts that resulted from the great plague had inflicted losses on the amirs who depended on the \textit{iqt\'a} income; therefore, they tried to obtain lands through suspect methods during the political instability wherein the sultan’s control over the government had weakened, by taking advantage of the frequent transfer of \textit{iqt\'a}’s whose holders were lost to the plague.\textsuperscript{18}

Nevertheless, when Barquq took power, he made efforts to resolve these two problems during his reign. However, although all his attempts succeeded initially, they proved to be inconclusive. With regard to the former problem, Vizier Ibn K\'atib Arl\'an succeeded in recovering lost lands from the possession of the amirs and rebuilding state finances during his tenure.\textsuperscript{19} However, his death in 789/1387 and Barquq’s temporary dethronement due to Amir Min\'ash’s rebellion in 791/1389 nullified the efforts put into the reconstruction of the landholding system. When Barquq recovered his position in the following year, 792/1389, he appointed several civilians, who had worked as viziers, to various financial posts at the D\'iw\'an al-Wiz\'arah for the purpose of “restor[ing] the condition of the state land to that in Ibn K\'atib Arl\'an’s years.”\textsuperscript{20} Nonetheless, the fact that a majority of them were relieved of their positions as early as the following year is an indication of the failure of this attempt. With regard to the latter, it is important to understand the manner in which the \textit{majlis} ended; however, two different endings are reported in the sources. While some sources such as \textit{Sul\'uk} claim that Barquq succeeded in confiscating \textit{waqf} lands and allotting them to the army as \textit{iqt\'a} regardless of strong opposition from the ulama,\textsuperscript{21} others, such as \textit{In$b\acute{a}’ al-Ghumr}, report that his

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnotesize{\textsuperscript{17} Sul\'uk, 3:346. The same method is often observed in the archival sources, and Ab\'u Gh\'azi estimates that 10 percent of the state land sales he counted on the basis of the archives had applied this method. See: Ab\'u Gh\'azi, \textit{Tat\'awwur}, 80–83.}
\item \footnotesize{\textsuperscript{18} Cf. Sul\'uk, 2:785.}
\item \footnotesize{\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 3:486–87, 569; Nuzhah, 1:60–62, 160–61; Ibn Q\'ad\'i Shuhbah, 1:103–4, 224–25; Manhal, 1:74–76; Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqal\'ani, \textit{In$b\acute{a}’ al-Ghumr bi-Abn\’a’ al-’Um\'r} (Cairo, 1969–98), 1:272, 338–39 (hereafter cited as \textit{In$b\acute{a}’ al-Ghumr}).}
\item \footnotesize{\textsuperscript{20} Ibn al-Furat, \textit{T\'arihkh al-Duwal wa-al-Mulu\'ik} (Beirut, 1936–42), 9:237–38 (hereafter cited as \textit{Ibn al-Furat}); Sul\'uk, 3:727–28; In$b\acute{a}’ al-Ghumr, 1:401; Ibn Q\'ad\'i Shuhbah, 1:350; Nuzhah, 1:317–18.}
\item \footnotesize{\textsuperscript{21} Sul\'uk, 3:347; Nujum, 11:166; Badr, fol. 104v.}
\end{itemize}
attempt resulted in failure owing to the opposition.\textsuperscript{22} It is difficult to judge the veracity of these reports. Although similar \textit{majālis} were called in 783/1381 and 789/1387 during Barquq’s reign\textsuperscript{23} and also under later sultans, not all of them succeeded in abrogating \textit{waqf}s. Moreover, owing to the opposition of the ulama, they went no further than imposing temporary levies on the \textit{waqf}s under emergency situations such as military expeditions.\textsuperscript{24} Therefore, this is an exceptional case even if the abrogation of \textit{waqf}s was carried out at the time. In reality, throughout the Mamluk era, state land sales had never been forbidden, nor had the confiscation of lands converted into \textit{waqf}s been legalized.\textsuperscript{25}

When Barquq seized power under these difficult circumstances, he not only made efforts to bring state finances under control, but also founded a new bureau, al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, for the purpose of anchoring the financial administration and achieving the political stability of his regime.

\section*{The Establishment of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad and the Transformation of the State Machinery}

Chancery manual sources such as \textit{Subh} explain al-Dīwān al-Mufrad as follows: it was an independent financial bureau in charge of providing the monthly wages (\textit{jāmakiyyah}), clothing allowances (\textit{kiswah}), fodder (\textit{'alāq}), and other provisions to the Royal Mamluks, having specific lands separate from those of the state treasury as its own resources. \textit{Ustādār al-sultān(al-`	extit{`alīyah} (the sultan’s/supreme majordomo), one of the military officers, managed this dīwān as chief, assuming the responsibilities of other officials such as \textit{nāẓir al-dīwān al-mufrad} (the deputy chief of the dīwān), scribes (\textit{kuttāb}), notaries (\textit{shuhūd}), and so on.\textsuperscript{26}}

While it is clear that this dīwān had been established by Barquq, there are two

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25}On the Islamic legal disputes regarding the legality of the sale and “waqfization” of state lands in the Mamluk era, see: Kenneth M. Cuno, “Ideology and Juridical Discourse in Ottoman Egypt: the Uses of the Concept of \textit{Irsād},” \textit{Islamic Law and Society} 6, no. 2 (1999): 145–49.
\end{itemize}
opinions regarding the actual year of its establishment; that is, 784/1382 or
797/1395.27 The former is based on an account in the Khiṭaṭ stating that it was
established by the conversion of an iqtā’ held by Barquq when he was an amir, into a revenue source “when he ascended to the sultanate.” 28 Accordingly, it regards
784/1382, the year of Barquq’s enthronement, as the year of establishment. On
the other hand, the latter opinion depends on an account in Nujūm stating that it was
established by the conversion of the iqtā’ belonging to Barquq’s son Muḥammad,
who died in 797/1395.29 In other words, the difference of opinion with respect to
the year of establishment of the dīwān arises from a question regarding its source
of revenue, i.e., whether it was originally Barquq’s iqtā’ or his son’s. We shall
now examine the actual establishment process of this dīwān on the basis of the
chronicle sources.

In the early years of Barquq’s reign as atābak al-ʿasākir from 779/1387, the
government had been jointly headed by Barquq and his colleague, Amir Barakah.
Subsequently, owing to the political differences between them, Barquq succeeded
in incarcerating Barakah and then killing him in Rabī’ I 782 (June 1380);30 consequently, Barquq’s regime attained stability. At this time, he gave Barakah’s
iqtā’, which was allotted to an amir of one hundred, and the amirate to his own
son Muḥammad, who was born on the first day of that month. He then appointed
Amir Sharaf al-Dīn Mūsā ibn Dandār ibn Qaramān as Muḥammad’s ustādār to be
the manager of his iqtā’, contrary to the prevailing custom that when the position
of an amir became vacant, it was given to another along with his iqtā’.31 It appears
reasonable to suppose that Barquq intended to profit from the iqtā’ held in the
name of his infant son as well as to prevent the emergence of a political rival by
not giving the vacant iqtā’ of the number two position to another amir. In the
meantime, Barquq retained his own iqtā’ as an amir of one hundred in addition to

29Khiṭaṭ, 3:723.
30Nujūm, 12:145–46.
being in charge of the financial affairs of the state as the atābak. During this time, Amir Bahādūr al-Manjākī (d. 790/1388) had served as Barquq’s ustādār and managed his iqṭā’. Thereafter, Barquq formally ascended to the sultanate in Ramadān 784 (November 1382) and immediately appointed his personal ustādār, Bahādūr, to the post of ustādār al-sultān with a rank of amir of forty, as well as to the post of Muhammad’s ustādār. Although the duties of the ustādār al-sultān had hitherto included taking charge of all the affairs relating to the sultan’s court and servitors as “majordomo,” Bahādūr’s duties mainly comprised financial management, much as the ustādārs of the amirs. Nevertheless, this does not immediately imply that al-Dīwān al-Mufrad was established during this time. The first reference to this dīwān was made in Dhu al-Qa’dah 788 (November 1386), in which Sa’d al-Dīn Naṣr Allāh ibn al-Baqarī, who had managed Barquq’s private financial affairs prior to his enthronement, was appointed as the nāẓir of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad “newly established (istajadda) by the sultan.” Therefore, it appears reasonable to suppose that this dīwān was officially established at this time. However, I believe that Muhammad’s iqṭā’, which had been under the control of the ustādār al-sultān, was probably added to the dīwān’s resources after his death in 797/1395 because his iqṭā’ remained separate from the land of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad after its establishment as it was previously; however, it might have been a de facto source of revenue for this dīwān.

Thus, we can summarize the establishment process of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad as follows: Barquq had kept for himself two iqṭā’s allotted to amirs of one hundred, which once belonged to Barquq and Barakah, as his own revenue source, and independent of the government purse, without allotting them to others even after his enthronement. Subsequently, he appointed the nāẓir and formally established this dīwān through the conversion of his former iqṭā’ into its revenue source in 788/1386, then added the other iqṭā’ to it later, possibly in 797/1395. If this is true, a question arises regarding the inducement for him to establish the dīwān. One reason could be that it was due to one of the policies aiming to augment the revenue of the state.

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32 Suluḵ, 3:393.
33 Ibid., 478; Nujūm, 11:228; Nuzhah, 1:49; Badr, fol. 116v.
34 Al-ʿUmarī, Masāliḵ al-ʾAbshār fi Mamālik al-ʾAmṣār (Cairo, 1985), 57–58; Subḥ, 4:20.
35 Suluḵ, 3:553; Nuzhah, 1:143. For the management of Barquq’s financial affairs, see: Suluḵ, 3:336.
36 Badr, fols. 139r, 145r.
37 The Royal Mamluks comprised the mushtarawāt, the Mamluks who were trained and organized by the sultan himself, called mushtarawāt, and...
also to ensure the regular distribution of monthly wages to them. During the chaotic period preceding Barquq’s ascent to the sultanate, the control of the Royal Mamluks was beyond the sultan’s power and even the mushtarawār had often participated in revolts by the amirs against the sultan demanding money.38 Because of this, following his enthronement, Barquq exiled the previous sultans’ mamluks and replaced them with his own in order to secure control over the Royal Mamluks.39 Therefore, the establishment of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad could be regarded as a corollary policy; that is, while the Royal Mamluks were sustained by iqtā’s allotted from the khāṣṣ land or the monthly wages paid from the state treasury, this system had been directly affected by the decrease in state lands. To counter this problem, Barquq ensured there would be an exclusive revenue source for the Royal Mamluks through the establishment of this dīwān. Accordingly, he succeeded in maintaining the mushtarawār, comprising a large number of mamluks, estimated at 5,000 men.40 The establishment of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad undoubtedly enabled Barquq to retain his power, unlike his predecessors during the late Bahri Mamluk period. However, it should be noted that this dīwān was organizationally and financially independent of the traditional financial system of the Mamluk state as it was originally established, because the dīwān itself was funded by iqtā’ lands. This made it possible for the dīwān to avoid the direct effects of the government’s financial difficulties which would affect the sultan’s power base directly; however, it also indicated that Barquq could not solve the fundamental problem causing these financial difficulties, and that it was difficult for the sultan to depend on the traditional financial system.

Consequently, the newly-established al-Dīwān al-Mufrad rapidly expanded its role, and the Mamluk state structure also came to be reorganized owing to its development. Initially, the financial affairs of the state were managed by three independent bureaus, namely, Dīwān al-Wizārah, Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ, and al-Dīwān al-Mufrad. Although each of these had its own revenue sources and was responsible for providing certain allowances, all of them were sometimes placed under the sole supervision of the mushir al-dawlah (counselor of the government).41 Although the role and revenue sources of each of these bureaus changed with time, they may be summarized as follows: Dīwān al-Wizārah obtained its income through

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38 Sultan Sha‘bān distributed money to his mamluks for the purpose of “securing himself by giving his money” [Sulāk, 3:139, 154], but he lost his position due to their participation in the amirs’ revolt (see note 6). For a case pertaining to Barquq’s mamluks in 784/1382, see: Sulāk, 3:473; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbāh, 1:84–85.

the collection of kharāj tax from particular districts such as Giza and Manfalūt and miscellaneous taxes (mukās), and undertook the responsibility of supplying meat and other food for the Royal Mamluks and others. Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ obtained its resources from taxes levied at Alexandria and other coastal ports on the Mediterranean, which covered expenses for the two feasts (‘Idayn), khil‘ahs, etc. Finally, as mentioned before, al-Dīwān al-Mufrad was responsible for the monthly stipends and other essentials for the Royal Mamluks.42

It is difficult to specify the exact year in which the division of state finances into these three bureaus was completed. However, it is fairly certain that the two prominent ustādārs, Yalbughā al-Sālimī (d. 811/1409) and Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf (d. 812/1409), who seized political and financial power during the civil war during the reign of Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj (801–8, 808–15/1399–1405, 1405–12), were associated with the transformation of the financial organization. Each of them was also an amir of one hundred exercising the general management and supervision of state finances as mushīr al-dawlah, and occasionally held concurrently the post of vizier.43 During their tenure, the office of the ustādār underwent a remarkable growth in importance, accompanied by a dramatic increase in the numerical strength of the staff of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad.44 In contrast, the office of vizier, which had hitherto played a crucial role in state finances, lost its importance.45 Based on this knowledge, we can judge that the transformation of the financial bureaucracy was achieved at approximately this time; however, this leaves still unanswered the question of whether this was an intentional policy clearly designed to transform the organization of state finances.

Parallel to the division of the state finances, the khāṣṣ land in Egypt was also allocated to the resources of each bureau.46 However, lands allotted to the Dīwān al-Wizārah and Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ accounted for only a small portion of the entire amount of land, and al-Dīwān al-Mufrad acquired the greater portion of it for itself47 along with some farm land in Syria.48 Consequently, al-Dīwān al-Mufrad

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43’Dīwān al-Inshā’, fol. 125r; Ḥadā‘iq, 119; Zubdah, 106; Popper, Systematic Notes, 1:96.
42On the roles, resources, and officials of each financial dīwān, see: Zubdah, 97–98, 106–9; Martel-Thoumian, Les civils et l’administration, 35–40, 49–53; Polsak, Feudalism, 4–5.
44Sulīk, 4:289; Inbā’ al-Ghumr, 3:38.
45Khiṭāt, 3:723–24; Taysīr, 71.
46Khiṭāt, 1:261.
became the most important office for Egyptian local administration, and the appointee to the post of ʿustādār al-sultān began to assume the additional post of Viceroy of Lower Egypt (nāʾib al-wajh al-baḥrī) from the reign of Sultan Faraj, and also of Upper Egypt (nāʾib al-wajh al-qiblī) from the reign of Sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy (825–41/1422–38). The appointee was also invested with the authority to appoint and dismiss local governors (wālī, kāshīf). Furthermore, the ʿustādār would often travel throughout the rural districts of Egypt in order to collect taxes himself.

With regard to the proportion of land assigned to al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, valuable information can be obtained from Intisār and Tuhfah, which recorded the name, size of the cultivated land, and the tax revenues of each tax district (nāḥiyah) in Egypt (see Table). This indicates that during the reign of Sultan Barquq, the agricultural land of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad in Egypt comprised only 14 districts with annual revenues (ʿibrah) estimated at approximately 200,000 dīnār jayshī (dj).

However, by the reign of Sultan Qāytbāy, approximately eighty years later, these numbers had increased tremendously; the number of districts had increased by approximately ten times (159 districts), and the amount of revenue collected had increased approximately seven times (1,413,858.3 dj). These districts were spread across most of the provinces of Egypt (17 of 21) and the average revenue from them was 8,892.2 dj, which was more than twice that of the revenues obtained

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49Dīwān al-Inshāʾ, fol. 126r–v; Ḥadāʾiq, 121; Khīṭat, 3:724. However, according to the chronicles, the first case of an ʿustādār holding the post of Viceroy of Lower Egypt came about in 800/1397 (i.e., toward the end of Barquq’s reign), and the first case of an ʿustādār holding the post of Viceroy of Upper and Lower Egypt came about in 824/1421 (i.e., the year in which Sultan al-Muzaffar Ahmad was enthroned). See: Suluk, 3:891, 4:568; Nuzhah, 2:498.
51Ibn Duqmāq, Kitāb al-Intisār li-Wāsiṭat ʿIqd al-Amṣār (Cairo, 1893); Ibn al-Jiʿān, Kitāb al-Tuhfah al-Ṣanīyah bi-Asmāʾ al-Bilād al-Miṣrīyah (Cairo, 1898). Notes on the Table: (1) All figures were rounded off to one decimal place. (2) If al-Dīwān al-Mufrad shared a tax district with other uses (such as private land, waqf, etc.), the ʿibrah of the diwān was calculated by dividing the ʿibrah of the district under consideration equally, except in a case wherein the ʿibrah of each was specified. (3) The ʿibrah, the average ʿibrah, and the percentage were calculated excluding those districts whose ʿibrahs were not known. Therefore, the total amount of ʿibrah for the whole of Egypt given in this Table differs from that written in the opening paragraph of Tuhfah. However, when calculating the percentage of ʿibrah of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, this showing of a general tendency is not a problem because there is a small difference of only one decimal place.

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from all the Egyptian districts, which was 4,107.8 dj. Moreover, 187 districts in Egypt provided revenues exceeding 10,000 dj, of which 47 belonged to al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, accounting for almost one-fourth of the total number. However, this dīwān also accounted for 20 of the 50 districts (40 percent) that provided revenues of 20,000 dj and more, and 10 of the 17 districts (almost 60 percent) that provided revenues of 30,000 dj and more, with the ratio rising in proportion to the revenue. These details immediately clarify that this dīwān, as a matter of priority, acquired a greater number of productive districts among the resources under its control. As a result, al-Dīwān al-Mufrad held the largest number of tax districts among the financial bureaus of the government, the income from which comprised 17.3 percent (i.e., more than 4 qirāṭs) of the revenues from all the rural districts of Egypt.

This increase in al-Dīwān al-Mufrad’s landholdings had been achieved by means of acquisition of not only khāṣṣ lands previously under the control of the Dīwān al-Wizārah but also iqṭā’s. The chronicles report several cases in which iqṭā’s of deceased or dismissed amirs were added to the resource pool of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad by sultans: those of three amirs of one hundred, one amir of forty, one amir of ten, and one amir of unknown rank.53 However, not all the iqṭā’s added to this dīwān were such high-yielding ones belonging to high-ranking amirs. According to Nujām, regarding Zayn al-Dīn Yahyá al-Ashqar (d. 874/1469), the ustādār during the reign of Sultan al-Zāhir Jaqmaq (842–57/1439–53), ”he seized numerous iqṭā’s of the Royal Mamluks and amirs, acquiring them by force, and added them to al-Dīwān al-Mufrad.” Ustādārs tried to seize iqṭā’s of lower-ranking amirs, mamlusks, and probably also the ḥalqah troopers for the purpose of discharging their duties and advancing their own interests at every opportunity.54 In addition, this dīwān benefited from other sources of revenue, notably, the government-managed waterwheels (dawālib) in 803/1401 and the income from the sultan’s monopoly on sugar in 832/1429. Moreover, a deficit in this dīwān was covered by

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54Nujām, 16:28. Haarmann also connects the decline in iqṭā’ holdings of the sons of the sultans (sūdī; pl. asyād) during the Circassian Mamluk period to the establishment of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad
sales of positions in local government in 824/1421.\textsuperscript{55}

These details show that the establishment of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad brought about and played a pivotal role in the reorganization of the administrative and financial bureaucracy. It clearly indicates that providing monthly stipends to the Royal Mamluks became the most important task of the government. As mentioned earlier, the Mamluk state had undergone a radical change in its political and power structure, resulting in the Royal Mamluks expanding their role in politics.\textsuperscript{56} Furthermore, they rioted when there were delays in the distribution of wages, which often escalated into open revolt against the sultan vociferously demanding his dethronement;\textsuperscript{57} therefore, the reliable distribution of wages became the primary concern of successive sultans. Viewed in this light, the establishment of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad can be regarded as an organizational adjustment to the new political structure.

On the other hand, it is important to note that al-Dīwān al-Mufrad developed through the acquisition of not only khāṣṣ lands but several iqtā’s as well. While the number of amirs of one hundred in Egypt had been fixed at 24 men owing to al-rawk al-Nāṣirī, all of these posts were rarely filled during the Circassian Mamluk period. According to Șubh, the decrease in the number of amirs of one hundred resulted from the establishment of this dīwān, and their number was reduced to 20 or less, and even 18 during the reign of Barqūq due to this reason. Thereafter, this decrease in the number persisted till the reign of Sultan Barsbāy in 840/1436, when it dipped to 13, and then 11 in 857/1453 during the reign of Sultan Jaqmaq.\textsuperscript{58} This indicates that on one hand al-Dīwān al-Mufrad accumulated a vast amount of agricultural land but on the other that iqtā’ lands for amirs decreased inversely, so that the ratio between the khāṣṣ land and the iqtā’s based on al-rawk al-Nāṣirī was being diminished.

Nevertheless, such a large-scale expansion of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad’s landholdings should not simply be regarded as part of an “innovation” to strengthen

\textsuperscript{58}Barqūq’s reign: Șubh, 4:14; Badr, fol. 162v. Barsbāy’s reign: Sulūk, 4:989. Jaqmaq’s reign:
the sultan’s autocratic power by an increase in the number of Royal Mamluks through the building up of this diwān. On the contrary, it resulted from the necessary addition of resources to this diwān, moving parallel to the gradually deteriorating financial situation, as we shall see in what follows.

**THE BANKRUPTCY OF AL-DĪWĀN AL-MUFRAD AND ITS IMPLICATIONS**

The economic decline caused by various factors such as plague was further aggravated during the Circassian Mamluk period. Accordingly, al-Dīwān al-Mufrad also experienced financial difficulties as early as the reign of Sultan Barsbāy, usually regarded as a relatively stable period. In Rajab 828 (May 1425), a large deficit was detected through an audit of the diwān; it amounted to 120,000 dinars per year. Similarly, another deficit, detected in Rabī’ II 832 (January 1429), had reached 60,000 dinars per year. The financial condition markedly deteriorated subsequent to the reign of Sultan Jaqmaq, during which many ustādārs resigned, fled, or were dismissed and suffered confiscation, and the Royal Mamluks frequently demonstrated against the arrears of their monthly wages. While the difficulty in managing this diwān was undoubtedly further aggravated by the economic decline, I would like to emphasize that its expenditures showed a consistent increase throughout the period under consideration. During the reign of Sultan Shaykh, the total amount spent on monthly wages accounted for 11,000 dinars per month; it subsequently increased to 18,000 dinars during Barsbāy’s reign, 28,000 dinars

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60 According to my analysis of the chronicles, there are 21 accounts on the financial failures of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad during 16 years and 8 months of his reign. It is remarkably larger than 5, the number of accounts of financial failures during the 14 years and 3 months of the reign of Sultan Faraj, and 2, during the 8 years and 5 months of the reign of Sultan al-Mu’ayyad Shaykh (815–24/1412–21).


62 During the reign of Barsbāy, 9 men assumed the post of ustādār a total of 13 times, and the average term of office at one time was 15.4 months. However, during the reign of Sultan al-Ashraf Înāl (857–65/1543–60), 7 men assumed the post a total of 12 times and the average term was 8.2 months, while during the reign of Sultan al-Zahir Khushqadam (865–72/1461–17), 5 men assumed it a total of 12 times, and the average term was 6.5 months. These figures indicate that the frequency of the substitution was increasing steadily. According to Miura, the average term of office of an ustādār during the period from the beginning of Barsbāy’s reign to Qāytbāy’s

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during Jaqmaq’s reign, and it finally reached 46,000 dinars in 873/1468, immediately after Qâytbây’s enthronement. Since these amounts excluded the expenditures on other necessities such as clothing allowances and fodder, the total expenditure of the diwan undoubtedly exceeded the given amount.

This increase in expenditures was not caused by an increase in the number of the sultan’s mamluks or radical pay raises; rather, it was caused by the inclusion of recipient groups other than mamluks. Several accounts are found in the sources wherein we can find that various groups such as the sons of the mamluks, referred to as awlâd al-nâs, Islamic jurisprudents (fuqahâ’), women, children, orphans, merchants, and other common people were also enrolled as recipients, receiving money and supplies from al-Diwân al-Mufrad similar to the mamluks after the reign of Jaqmaq, particularly after 860/1455:

If only a sultan’s mamluk was [a recipient], what do you think about the present [circumstances]? Countless people comprising “men of the turban” (muta’ammimûn: religious men), the awlâd al-nâs, merchants (tujjâr), common people (‘âmmah), and even Christians had been enrolled with the sultan’s treasury (bayt al-sulṭân) [as recipients]. The situation departed from the rule and transcended its boundaries. Viziers were unable to provide meat supplies, and ustâdârs also were unable to [provide] the monthly wages and fodder. These incidents were unheard of before, except following the reign of Sultan Jaqmaq (may God have mercy upon him).

It may be reasonable to believe that in its development, al-Diwân al-Mufrad assumed the additional responsibility of providing for some of the needs of “men of the turban” and the poor, which prior to its establishment would have been provided by the sultan’s mamluks. However, this increase was superficial and primarily resulted from the state of disorder of the monetary system; that is, the widespread circulation of copper coins and the consequent decline in the value of the dirham. On the conversion rates and the prices in this period, see: E. Ashtor, *Histoire des prix et des salaires dans l’orient medieval* (Paris, 1969), Chaps. 6, 7; Popper, *Systematic Notes*, 2:41–106.


66Hawâdithî, 691.
carried out by the government as charity. However, more noteworthy reasons for the increase in the numbers and types of recipients were: first, the new, formal recognition of the awlād al-nās as recipients and second: the increase in the informal recipients registered fraudulently.

(1) The Awlād al-Nās

The sons of the mamluks, referred to as awlād al-nās, began to be enrolled in al-Dīwān al-Mufrad and like the mamluks, received monthly wages and provisions. The awlād al-nās were originally military men belonging to the ḥalqah troops, receiving iqtā’s from the sultan. A question arises as to the circumstances that required their enrollment, which started on a regular basis during the reign of Sultan Jaqmaq. I believe it was the ultimate consequence of the long-term decline of the ḥalqah that began during the late Bahri Mamluk period. It is widely known that the ḥalqah troops became impoverished and began to sell their iqtā’s for money in the last decades of the Bahri Mamluk period, however, their condition continued to deteriorate under the Circassian Mamluks. In Ramaḍān 821 (October 1418), Sultan Shaykh initiated the reconstitution of the ḥalqah and improved the chances of a ḥalqah trooper holding an iqtā’ based on his status. That is to say, amirs often purchased the ḥalqah troopers’ iqtā’s or acquired them in the names of their own mamluks and eunuchs. The sultan’s mamluks also acquired ḥalqah troopers’ iqtā’s in addition to their own monthly wages. Accordingly, several ḥalqah troopers who lost their revenue source entered into the service of the amirs as “mamluks of the amirs.” This indicates that the iqtā’s of the ḥalqah gradually came into the possession of the mamluks and amirs, the higher-ranking military class, contrasting with the decline of the ḥalqah. In addition, the situation wherein ‘iqtā’s were lost by being turned into rizqahs, milks, etc.” was also regarded as a

67 Taysr, 73; Dīwān al-Insh, fol. 133v.
69 On the decline of the ḥalqah troops and the sale of iqtā’s of the ḥalqah troopers, see: ibid., 451–56; Khit, 3:710–11. While the origin of this phenomenon lay in al-rawk al-Nasirī, which sharply reduced the revenues from iqtā’s for the ḥalqah troopers, the plagues that had been frequent since 749/1348–49 also aggravated this problem. In addition to causing extensive damage to the rural areas and decreasing income from the iqtā’s, several iqtā’s that lost their holders to the plagues fell into the hands of non-military men. See: Dols, Black Death, 273–75; Sato, State and Rural Society, 159–60.
70 Nujm, 14:69–71; Sulūk, 4:461–64; Inbā’ al-Ghumr, 3:169. There are several examples wherein a sultan’s mamluk held an iqtā’ of a ḥalqah trooper. For example, when the monthly wages were distributed to the Royal Mamluks in Rabī’ II 827 (March 1424), wages of mamluks who also held iqtā’s of the ḥalqah troopers were deducted. See: Sulūk, 4:661.
reason for the decline of the *halqah*,\(^{71}\) and the alienation of the state lands mentioned above continued uninterrupted, directly influencing the decrease in the land for *iqṭāʾ*. In any case, this effort of Sultan Shaykh’s was largely futile and the decline of the *halqah* proceeded.

The continued decline of the *halqah* troops and their disappearance as a military unit naturally and directly affected the sons of the mamluks, who joined the military unit as "*awlād al-nās*" troopers. One possibility is to assume that the enrollment of *awlād al-nās* in al-Dīwān al-Mufrad was in keeping with a policy to maintain them as a military unit by directly providing wages in cash from the state treasury instead of *iqṭāʾ*, which had been gradually reduced during the period under consideration. The fact that Sultan Ḥāyṯbāy tested the *awlād al-nās* on their military ability by making them draw their bows and deducted the monthly wages of those who were unsuccessful in the examination proves that the wage for the *awlād al-nās* paid from al-Dīwān al-Mufrad was officially regarded as compensation for military service. But in fact a majority of them had never possessed any abilities suited to military service, nor had they received an amount necessary to support them. This is proved by the following account (885/1481) regarding the inspection of *halqah* members in which they are ordered to maintain their military equipment and acquire military training:

However, as for the *awlād al-nās*, no previous sultan had ever reviewed them, or ignored them even if they had reviewed them [with the army]. . . . One [of them] receiving a monthly wage of as much as 500 or 300 dirhams [as opposed to the regular sum for a mamluk of 2,000 dirhams] and having dependents is poor. Where can he raise additional [money] in order [to pay] for a sword, a lance, or a quiver? These are the people who preceding sultans allowed to have presents of alms (*ṣadaqah*) from the sultan’s treasury.\(^{72}\)

As this account indicates, the monthly wages paid to the *awlād al-nās* were not well-earned rewards for military service; rather, they were a kind of “public-assistance payment” for the sons of the mamluks. We can say that the novel enrollment of the *awlād al-nās* in al-Dīwān al-Mufrad as formal recipients of stipends indicated that the traditional military *iqṭāʾ* system had reached a dead end as a consequence of the continuous decrease in state lands.

(2) **Informal Recipients**

\(^{71}\) Nuǧūm, 14:71.

\(^{72}\) Inbāʿ al-Ḥaṣr, 501–2.
There were several categories of informal recipients who were enrolled in al-Dīwān al-Mufrad. If we examine the people who acquired the right to receive wages from this dīwān and the channels through which they achieved it, they may be divided into two groups. The first group includes “the people connected with influential men in the state (mudāfi kibār al-dawlah).” It can be stated with a fair amount of certainty that they had connections and became recipients with the aid of their patrons. The majority of these are assumed to be mamluks and private staff of the amirs although there were various kinds of people among them. In the aforementioned account pertaining to Sultan Shaykh’s policy that aimed for the reconstruction of the ḥalqah, it is stated that the amirs enrolled their mamluks and eunuchs in this dīwān so that they could acquire monthly wages in addition to acquiring ḥalqah troopers’ iqtā’s for their own uses (see note 70). For example, there was a case wherein an ustādār enrolled his own mamluks in this dīwān as “sultan’s mamluks” and paid them wages from it. Another example is that of Amir Burdbak al-Bajmaqdar (d. 875/1470), an eminent amir who successively held various high offices such as Viceroy of Aleppo, Viceroy of Damascus, etc., and who compelled viziers and ustādārs to provide him and the men in his service with monthly wages and various supplies. It is obvious that these types of people had included themselves among the regular recipients in view of the fact that amirs often balked at the attempts of sultans to reduce their stipends.

The second group includes the people who purchased their status as recipients. Al-Ashqar, who had occupied the position of ustādār for more than ten years during the reign of Sultan Jaqmaq, was given free rein in the management of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, which was mired in financial difficulties. Due to a lack of operating funds, he began to sell the rights of receiving wages from this dīwān in order to obtain funds to disburse the monthly wages. Consequently, various people fraudulently acquired wages as “sultan’s mamluks.” Furthermore, it was inevitable that these wages fell into the hands of wealthy people; there were amirs who also received monthly wages, or mamluks who gained more than one stipend at a time. In 873/1468, Qāytbāy attempted to reestablish the principle that each mamluk would receive only 2,000 dirhams (i.e., the regular stipend) and compelled mamluks who purchased stipend-receiving status or received more than this amount to

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73 Hawādith, 678; Inbā’ al-Ḥaṣr, 16.
74 Inbā’ al-Ḥaṣr, 173.
75 Ibid., 300.
76 Sulāk, 3:1103; Nuzhah, 2:165; Hawādith, 1:426; Badā’i, 2:320. Sultan Qāytbāy did not approve the intervention of the amirs in his attempts at reforming al-Dīwān al-Mufrad in 873/1468 [Hawādith, 693].
77 On the sale of the monthly wages and its repercussions, see: Inbā’ al-Ḥaṣr, 34.
return them to the sellers (probably including rank and file mamluks and awlād al-nās). This explains the manner in which the sale of wages became widespread.

Under these circumstances, al-Ashqar managed al-Dīwān al-Mufrad as well as possible using all the means within his power, such as seizing iqṭā’s and rizqahs for the dīwān’s resources. Nevertheless, this was nothing more than ad hoc management depending on his own discretion; thus, it ceased to function following the death of his supporter, Jaqmaq. Furthermore, a part of the agricultural land from the dīwān’s resources frequently fell into the hands of amirs and mamluks aiming to acquire the lands as iqṭā during times of political unrest, such as the interval between a sultan’s death and a new sultan’s enthronement. In addition, powerful amirs’ himayah (private protection) over farm villages, which became widespread during this period and prevented local officials from collecting taxes from them undoubtedly exerted a negative influence on this dīwān, which depended heavily on tax returns from rural districts. Therefore, sultans regularly had to meet this dīwān’s deficit from their own purses because it could not otherwise be operated. During the reign of Khushqadam, the fact that the ustādār was awarded a khil’ah and was lauded each time he was able to provide stipends to the mamluks proves the difficulty of performing this job at this time. These circumstances compelled Qāyatbāy, who ascended to the sultanate in 872/1468, to immediately embark on a thorough financial reform. However, this will not be discussed in this article for lack of space.

**Conclusion**

On the basis of our analysis of the historical development of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad from its establishment till the time of its fiscal bankruptcy, two important facts relating not only to this dīwān but also to the structure of the Mamluk regime itself were clarified. Firstly, the growing weakness of the system of land management under the sole authority of the state had a persistent influence on the establishment, development, and, finally, bankruptcy of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad. This dīwān was established against the background of a problem, namely, the alienation of

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78 Hawādith, 690; Inbā‘ al-Haṣr, 36. Similarly, the rights to receive meat supplies from Dīwān al-Wizārah were also dealt with [Badā‘i, 3:23, 331] and pensions (ma‘āsh) for the poor/Sufis (fuqara‘) and others were sold at a high price [Nujum, 16:28].


81 Tayṣīr, 95–96, 135–36.

82 Hawādith, 413, 449, 491, 757; Hawādith, 1:453.

83 Hawādith, 486, 491–92, 493, 495.
agricultural lands from the state treasury. However, this continued to be perceived as a problem without an effective solution throughout the Circassian Mamlik period. As Abū Ghāzī describes it, the state land sales rapidly increased in the 850s/1446–56 and a majority of those lands sold fell into the hands of the upper class of Mamluks, such as the sultans and amirs. This problem was directly related to the malfunctioning of the iqtā’ system; the privatization and inheritance of iqtā’ lands were widespread during the period under consideration, and the iqtā’ system was shaken to its foundations. It can be said that the large increase in al-Dīwān al-Mufrad’s landholdings resulted from the ceaseless efforts to raise money for the monthly stipends of the relatively lower-class Mamluks (and their sons) who had been directly affected to a greater extent by these problems of the iqtā’ system, by means of concentrating the gradually decreasing state lands, either khāṣṣ lands or iqtā’s, into this dīwān. Simultaneously, it meant that redistributing agricultural lands based on government initiatives such as al-rawk al-Nāṣirī were impossible, because titles to lands such as private holdings, waqf, lease, himāyah, etc., were complicated.

Secondly, in relation to the above, the government’s ability to control the distribution or withholding of remuneration, not only iqtā’s but also the monthly stipends or other provisions, through the machinery of the state had weakened. In contrast, powerful amirs were striving to acquire interests from the state for themselves, and even their followers acquired interests with their support. It appears reasonable to suppose that this situation suggesting “the privatization of the state” that Sabra refers to was closely linked to the emergence of the personal factions/households referred to as jamā’ah or bāb, which formed around powerful figures (including amirs, civilians, and qadis), and expanded their roles in politics and society during the late Mamluk period. However, this is irrelevant to the main subject. In a political structure where one of the powerful amirs would ascend to the sultanate with the support of a Mamluk factional power base and through an agreement among the Mamluks, it essentially enabled other powerful

84Abū Ghāzī, Tatawwur, 26–28, 110–11. However, I agree with Adam Sabra that the alienation of state lands was a part of the privatization of state resources by the Mamluk elite (and their descendants) linked to a change in the character of the Mamluk elite opposing Abū Ghāzī’s view that it induced the rise of a new class of private landowners with the opening of a land market. Adam Sabra, “The Rise of a New Class? Land Tenure in Fifteenth-Century Egypt: A Review Article,” Mamluk Studies Review 8, no. 2 (2004): 207–10.
amirs to interfere in the workings of the administration. Thus, the sultan’s control through the state machinery naturally had its limits although it was in varying degrees according to the sultan’s ability and his power base. Inferentially, the sultan, as the “principal Mamluk,” had first of all to protect the interests of all the Mamluks, ensuring an equitable distribution of wealth and its allotment among them.88 On the basis of an understanding of the nature of the sultan’s power and the political structure, we can explain the role of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad from a different perspective; that is, securing resources through the establishment of the dīwān and its continuous development achieved institutional stability in training and maintaining a certain number of Mamluks despite the adverse financial situation. In other words, it functioned as an effective mechanism in sustaining the Mamluk military system that produced the ruling military elites through the purchase, training, and emancipation of slaves, which was a fundamental basis of the Mamluk regime. It also enabled the continuance of their rule during the period of economic decline and the collapse of the state structure. Furthermore, the observation that the Royal Mamluks comprised the mushtarawāt of the ruling sultan and the mustakhdamūn trained by preceding sultans (see note 37) as well as the fact that powerful amirs had let their followers receive wages from al-Dīwān al-Mufrad indicates that not only the sultan but also several Mamluk factions and their leaders, namely, powerful amirs, had their own vested interests in this dīwān. In other words, the development of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad and various other efforts to ensure the regular payment of monthly stipends were linked to the common interest of the Mamluk community, beyond the original plan supporting the preferential treatment of only the sultan’s mamluks.

88 Under the Circassian Mamluks in particular, the members of those Mamluk factions who were trained and emancipated by the same sultan functioned as political interest groups. It was essential for sultans to manage the government through balancing the interests of such factions. On the Mamluk factionalism in politics and the power structure of the sultan, see: Robert Irwin, “Factions in Medieval Egypt,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1986): 228–46; Levanoni, “The Mamluk Conception.”
### Table: Egyptian Nahiya Assignments to Al-Diwān al-Mufrad in the Reigns of Qaytbay and Barquq

**The Reign of Qaytbay (Around 885/1480)**

(According to Tuhfah)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province (iqlim/a‘mal)</th>
<th>Number of Nahiya (dj)</th>
<th>Total ‘Ibrah (dj)</th>
<th>Average ‘Ibrah (dj)</th>
<th>D. al-Mufrad ‘Ibrah (dj)</th>
<th>Average Percentage</th>
<th>D. al-Mufrad ‘Ibrah (dj)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Egypt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Suburbs of Cairo</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>al-Qalyubiyyah</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>365,500</td>
<td>6,768.5</td>
<td>31,800</td>
<td>15,900</td>
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<td>3,951.4</td>
<td>267,950</td>
<td>14,886.1</td>
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<td>44,700</td>
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<td>2,193.2</td>
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<td>175,890.3</td>
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<td>Fuwwawah</td>
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<td>4,264</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,666.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for Lower Egypt</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,615</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,028,623.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,460.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>731,900.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,786.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Upper Egypt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province (iqlim/a‘mal)</th>
<th>Number of Nahiya (dj)</th>
<th>Total ‘Ibrah (dj)</th>
<th>Average ‘Ibrah (dj)</th>
<th>D. al-Mufrad ‘Ibrah (dj)</th>
<th>Average Percentage</th>
<th>D. al-Mufrad ‘Ibrah (dj)</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>al-Asyūṭīyah</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total for Upper Egypt</strong></td>
<td><strong>678</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,146,873.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,860.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>681,958</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,491.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>21.7</strong></td>
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</table>

**Total for Egypt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province (iqlim/a‘mal)</th>
<th>Number of Nahiya (dj)</th>
<th>Total ‘Ibrah (dj)</th>
<th>Average ‘Ibrah (dj)</th>
<th>D. al-Mufrad ‘Ibrah (dj)</th>
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<th>D. al-Mufrad ‘Ibrah (dj)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Egypt</td>
<td>1,615</td>
<td>5,028,623.5</td>
<td>3,460.2</td>
<td>731,900.3</td>
<td>7,786.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Egypt</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>3,146,873.2</td>
<td>5,860.1</td>
<td>681,958</td>
<td>10,491.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total for Egypt</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,293</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,175,496.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,107.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,413,858.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,892.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.3</strong></td>
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</table>

(According to Intisār)